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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Jason Collura, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his civil 
rights action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 Because the parties are familiar with the history and details of this case, we 
provide only a summary.  In 2013, Collura filed a federal civil rights complaint under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He alleged violations of his civil rights in connection with his 2005 
criminal case in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, over which the 
Honorable Pamela P. Dembe presided.  Collura named as defendants Judge Dembe, the 
City of Philadelphia, and several probation officers of the Probation and Parole 
Department of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court granted 
Judge Dembe’s motion to dismiss on judicial immunity grounds and the City of 
Philadelphia’s motion to dismiss because the City did not employ the probation officers.  
The District Court certified the dismissals under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  We affirmed in 2016.  See Collura v. Ford, 637 F. App’x 673 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(per curiam, not precedential).  The case resumed against the individual probation 
officers, including Nicholas Ford. 
 Meanwhile, in 2015, Collura, using his initials “J.C.,” filed another civil action 
docketed at E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 15-cv-04745.  The complaint contained similar allegations 
against Ford and the other probation officers during the same period.  The complaint also 
added defendants and allegations concerning an expanded time frame.  The District Court 
dismissed the complaint.  We affirmed with respect to the dismissal of official capacity 
claims but vacated and remanded for further proceedings on the individual capacity 
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claims.  See J.C. v. Ford, 674 F. App’x 230 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam, not precedential).  
On remand, the District Court dismissed the claims against all defendants except Ford.  
Because the 2013 complaint was ongoing against Ford regarding similar allegations, the 
2015 case was transferred to the presiding judge in the 2013 complaint.  In September 
2017, the District Court consolidated the two cases and directed the filing of a 
consolidated amended complaint in the lead case (the 2013 case underlying this appeal) 
concerning the remaining claims and defendants. 
 Instead of filing an amended complaint, Collura filed numerous unsuccessful 
motions for judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, default judgment, and other 
motions.  He also filed a mandamus petition to contest the District Court’s rulings and the 
consolidation order; we denied the petition.  See In re:  J.C., 731 F. App’x 129 (3d Cir. 
2018) (per curiam, not precedential).  In March 2018, the District Court directed Collura 
to comply with the September 2017 order and file a consolidated amended complaint 
within 30 days.  Collura did not comply and continued to file motions for default 
judgment, motions for full or partial summary judgment, and motions to sever and for 
disqualification of the District Court Judge.  In March 2019, the District Court denied 
Collura’s motions and again directed him to comply with the September 2017 order.  
Instead of doing so, Collura filed additional motions, including a motion for 
reconsideration of the March 2019 order.  In addition, Collura filed yet another 
mandamus petition to contest various District Court rulings, including the denial of his 
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motion for disqualification.  We denied the petition.  See In re: Collura, 773 F. App’x 104 
(3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam, not precedential). 
 In May 2019, the District Court denied relief on Collura’s motions and dismissed 
his case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  The District Court noted Collura’s 
consistent failure to comply with court orders, including the September 2017 order, 
March 2018 order, and March 2019 order, directing him to file an amended complaint.  
Collura filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. 
 This appeal followed.1  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A district 
court has the authority to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute by virtue of its inherent 
power and under Rule 41(b).  See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454 (3d Cir. 1994).  
We review such a dismissal for an abuse of discretion.  See Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 
1424, 1429 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 Collura argues that Rule 41(b) does not authorize sua sponte dismissals, but we 
long have recognized the propriety of sua sponte action under Rule 41(b).  See Spain, 
26 F.3d at 455 (holding that sua sponte Rule 41(b) dismissal was appropriate, noting that 
no motion was required).  Collura also asserts that the District Court erred in failing to 
conduct an analysis of the factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  Ordinarily, a district court must consider the Poulis 
 
1 In June 2020, months after filing his notice of appeal, Collura filed a motion under Rule 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The District Court denied the motion.  
Collura’s notice of appeal from that ruling was docketed at C.A. No. 21-1089.  That 
matter is outside the scope of this appeal. 
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factors before sua sponte dismissing a suit as a sanction.  Yet when a plaintiff’s refusal to 
comply with an order makes adjudication of the case impossible, a court may dismiss a 
case without conducting a Poulis analysis.  See Guyer, 907 F.2d at 1430 (discussing 
continued willful refusal to obey an explicit order, despite several chances to comply); 
see also Spain, 26 F.3d at 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing failure to prosecute 
remaining claims in response to receiving adverse rulings).  Such is the case here.  
Collura refused to comply with the District Court’s repeated orders to file an amended 
complaint so that his case could proceed, choosing instead to file numerous motions.  We 
conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred, and that the District Court’s dismissal of 
Collura’s case was appropriate.2  We also discern no error in the denial of Collura’s 
motion for reconsideration, as he did not present a proper basis for reconsideration.  See 
Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 We have considered Collura’s arguments and conclude that they are without merit.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s orders. 
 
2 Collura suggests that we must review the District Court’s prior rulings as well as the 
dismissal order.  See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 17 and n.17 (quoting Hendler v. United 
States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“When errors of law in the underlying 
orders sent the trial court down the wrong path, courts have reviewed the merits of the 
underlying decisions as well as the final dismissal sanction.”).  Yet Hendler recognizes an 
exception to the merger of interlocutory orders with a final order, when that final order is 
a dismissal for bad faith or dilatory conduct.  See Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1368 (stating that 
“[t]o hold otherwise would open up a back door route to review of interlocutory orders 
and would reward bad conduct.”)  We decline to expand the scope of our review here. 
